Environnement politique et institutionnel
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Source : African Economic outlook – 2015 – Banque Africaine de Développement (E16F)
Préambule
L’année 2014 a été marquée par plusieurs avancées majeures de la démocratie en Afrique – depuis la nouvelle constitution adoptée en Tunisie à la transition au Burkina Faso en passant par des élections, pour l’essentiel pacifiques et crédibles, qui ont mobilisé environ 179 millions de citoyens dans 12 pays.
Toutefois, plusieurs pays ont continué d’être affectés par l’instabilité, des actes de terrorisme ou des conflits.
Le continent reste malgré tout sur une trajectoire d’amélioration de la gouvernance. En 2013, 387 millions d’Africains subsahariens vivaient dans un pays démocratique, contre 2,5 millions en 1970. La hausse de la participation politique fait partie des gains de gouvernance les plus notoires depuis 2008. À part cette hausse de la participation politique, les progrès ou les revers en matière de gouvernance depuis 2008 sont, globalement, assez limités.
Les progrès sont fragiles et pourraient bien être annihilés faute de s’atteler aux causes du terrorisme et des guerres civiles et à leurs manifestations.
En dépit des mauvaises nouvelles qui ont émaillé l’année, quelques points positifs et des gains de gouvernance
L’année 2014 a connu quelques évolutions positives sur le plan de la gouvernance. En Tunisie, la constitution adoptée en janvier consacre la liberté religieuse et garantit l’égalité hommes-femmes. Les scrutins législatifs et présidentiels d’octobre et de décembre, peu contestés, sont venus confirmer la tendance. Vingt ans après les élections historiques de 1995, qui avaient marqué la fin de l’apartheid, l’Afrique du Sud a vécu son cinquième scrutin pacifique. Globalement, plus de 179 millions d’Africains se sont rendus aux urnes pour des élections très majoritairement pacifiques et crédibles (voir la section « Malgré des gains de participation politique évidents, les résultats sont plus mitigés pour la gestion du secteur public et l’environnement des affaires »). Au Burkina Faso, des manifestations de masse ont entraîné la chute du président Compaoré, suivie par la nomination rapide d’un gouvernement de transition. Au-delà de ces bonnes nouvelles, l’année 2014 a connu plusieurs défis en matière de gouvernance. La guerre se poursuit en Libye, en République centrafricaine (RCA) et au Soudan du Sud, avec des effets de contagion dans les pays voisins. Le Nigéria et les pays limitrophes ont été déstabilisés par les attaques et les enlèvements répétés imputés à Boko Haram tandis que dans la Corne de l’Afrique, les chabab continuent de perpétrer des violences. L’épidémie d’Ebola qui a frappé la Guinée, le Libéria et la Sierra Leone a révélé la fragilité des systèmes de santé africains face à de tels phénomènes même si elle a, parallèlement, démontré l’importance de l’engagement des responsables au niveau des communautés. Quelque 3 072 migrants auraient perdu la vie, selon les estimations, en tentant de franchir la Méditerranée pour fuir des conditions économiques et politiques intenables dans leurs pays, contre 4 077 dans le reste du monde – un chiffre en nette progression par rapport à 2013, puisqu’il se situait autour des 700 (Brian et Laczko, 2014).
Les gains de gouvernance perdurent
Malgré les difficultés rencontrées en 2014, le continent reste sur une trajectoire d’amélioration de la gouvernance. Les avancées sont impressionnantes comparées à la situation prévalant dans les années 1970. Elles sont plus modestes si l’on examine l’évolution depuis la crise mondiale de 2008/09. En se plaçant dans une perspective de long terme, la proportion de régimes en Afrique pouvant être considérés, partiellement au moins, comme des démocraties a sensiblement augmenté depuis la première vague de décolonisation et d’indépendance – un mouvement qui ne s’est pas interrompu depuis le pic de la fin des années 1980. En 1972, le continent comptait 4 démocraties pour 36 autocraties. En 2013, la proportion était passée à 24 démocraties, seulement 5 autocraties et 22 régimes hybrides (à mi-chemin entre les deux). En nombre d’habitants, la répartition est la suivante : en 1970, 2.5 millions d’Africains subsahariens vivaient dans un régime démocratique, contre 387 millions en 2013. Cette hausse s’explique en grande partie par la démocratisation de l’Afrique du Sud et du Nigéria (données du Center for Systemic Peace sur les régimes politiques depuis 1946 ; séries de données de population de la Banque mondiale). Même si la gouvernance n’a pas régressé depuis 2009, les progrès mesurés par l’indice Ibrahim de la gouvernance africaine (IIAG) (Fondation Mo Ibrahim, 2014) ont été négligeables, à l’exception de la participation politique. Les avancées sont pratiquement inexistantes depuis 2009 pour les dimensions suivantes : gestion du secteur public, environnement des affaires, état de droit, responsabilité de l’État vis-à-vis des citoyens, sécurité des individus, sécurité intérieure et droits de l’homme.
Les trajectoires de gouvernance divergent, y compris entre pays comparables
L’absence de progrès manifestes d’ensemble ces dernières années sur le continent occulte des améliorations remarquables dans certains pays et des régressions ailleurs (Fondation Mo Ibrahim, 2014, tableau 5.1 ; Banque mondiale, 2014). De fait, la plupart des évolutions les plus importantes survenues dans le monde en matière de gouvernance, positives et négatives, impliquent l’Afrique. Les facteurs sous-tendant les gains de gouvernance sont aussi divers que les pays africains eux-mêmes, même s’ils sont plutôt intérieurs qu’extérieurs. Ils peuvent être liés à l’essor d’une classe moyenne urbaine, à l’augmentation du nombre de personnes instruites, au taux de connectivité des jeunes et aux attentes en matière d’amélioration des niveaux de vie après une décennie de croissance. Par ailleurs, la professionnalisation des forces armées, qui sont aussi plus disciplinées (le résultat de dix années de réformes dans l’armée et la police), et la détermination des dirigeants à améliorer la gestion publique ont probablement joué un rôle. Enfin, l’impact positif de la mondialisation sur l’environnement des affaires pourrait être un facteur de progrès. Les trajectoires de pays comparables ont, elles aussi, divergé.
Le terrorisme transnational et la guerre civile sont les deux principales menaces pesant sur les gains de gouvernance
Le terrorisme et les trafics qui l’alimentent – qu’il s’agisse d’Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) et de Boko Haram en Afrique de l’Ouest, d’Ansar al-Sharia en Afrique du Nord ou encore des chabab en Afrique de l’Est – constituent une menace manifeste pour la croissance et le développement du continent. Pour le président ghanéen et de la CEDEAO John Mahama, « le terrorisme est comme un cancer. Si nous ne nous y attaquons pas, il continuera de se propager. Il menace tous les habitants de la sous-région. Avec le terrorisme, nul n’est à l’abri ». Le groupe Boko Haram (« L’éducation occidentale est un péché ») a tué des milliers de personnes en 2014, essentiellement au Nigéria, mais également au Cameroun, au Niger et au Tchad (Neumann, 2014). En janvier 2015, l’organisation terroriste contrôlait près de 50 000 km² de territoire, à cheval sur les États nigérians de Borno et Yobe. Malgré la campagne « BringBackOurGirls » – une initiative locale qui a eu un retentissement dans le monde entier – la plupart des écolières enlevées en avril 2014 par Boko Haram sont toujours aux mains de leurs ravisseurs. Quant aux chabab (« La jeunesse »), qui ont perdu le contrôle des principales villes et de la capitale somalienne en 2011, ils sont responsables de la mort de 266 personnes en Somalie et au Kenya en 2014, dans le sillage de l’attaque meurtrière contre un centre commercial de Nairobi, en 2013. Le gouvernement somalien reste fragile, avec son troisième Premier ministre en deux ans à la suite de mésententes entre le président et les deux premiers titulaires du poste (note pays sur la Somalie). Ces réseaux terroristes se financent grâce au trafic régional d’armes, de drogues et d’êtres humains. Boko Haram reçoit des fonds de ses militants et d’autres réseaux terroristes, dont Al-Qaïda, et profite du narcotrafic et de la traite humaine. De la même manière, les chabab sont soutenus par d’autres groupes terroristes, des États parrains, la diaspora somalienne ou des organisations caritatives et se livrent à quantité d’activités lucratives (piraterie, enlèvements, extorsions auprès des entreprises locales, contrebande de charbon, de sucre et d’ivoire). Bien que l’intervention militaire menée au Mali en janvier 2013 sous l’égide de la France ait désorganisé les réseaux des narcotrafiquants, ceux-ci opèrent dans plusieurs pays, y compris la Libye, la Mauritanie et le Niger (ICG, 2013). L’Afrique de l’Est fait également figure de nouvelle plaque tournante pour le trafic d’héroïne en provenance d’Afghanistan, même si les volumes introduits en contrebande restent inférieurs à ceux qui transitent via l’Asie centrale et l’Iran. Au-delà des initiatives mondiales de lutte contre le terrorisme, chaque pays doit développer ses propres réponses. La faiblesse des États, le chômage et le manque de participation sont autant de défis à relever. L’identification des antagonismes locaux sera essentielle pour éviter de les alimenter et d’offrir ce faisant aux réseaux régionaux une occasion idéale pour s’approprier les ordres du jour locaux. Pour citer le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, Ban Ki-Moon, « les missiles peuvent tuer les terroristes.
Mais la bonne gouvernance tue le terrorisme ». Le terrorisme est par nature transnational mais il se nourrit des problèmes locaux, des divisions de la société et des frustrations. « Les conditions locales et les réponses locales sont à l’origine de la radicalisation et du terrorisme » (ISS, 2014). Et c’est bien ce qui se passe avec Boko Haram, qui prétend depuis 2002 répondre aux doléances des Nigérians, qui n’en peuvent plus des dysfonctionnements de la gouvernance locale et, notamment, de la corruption et des inégalités régionales. Sa réponse ? L’application d’une version extrêmement rigoureuse de la charia. Un grand nombre de miliciens sont des jeunes peu instruits, notamment sur le plan de la religion, et issus de milieux pauvres. Mais les opérations menées au Cameroun et au Niger en 2014 et les contacts avec Al-Qaïda trahissent aussi des visées régionales. L’organisation terroriste pourrait être scindée en deux factions – l’une oeuvrant à l’installation d’un État islamique au Nigéria et l’autre étant chargée de semer la terreur dans la région. Les chabab ont eux aussi deux attachements antagonistes – la lutte contre le gouvernement fédéral et la mission de l’UA en Somalie (AMISOM), d’une part, et la volonté de dominer la région, d’autre part. En Libye, les retournements rapides d’alliances à l’échelon local influeront sur les destinés du pays. Les conflits violents, définis comme des revendications politiques et/ou territoriales obligeant des forces armées à s’interposer entre les parties opposées, continuent de sévir au sein même des pays plutôt qu’entre pays. Mais leurs retombées sur les autres pays sont de plus en plus manifestes. Il peut s’agir d’incursions armées et de déplacements de milices, mais aussi des flux d’armes et de drogues qui les financent, ou encore des réfugiés.
The business environment has improved markedly in countries that needed it the most
Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the most difficult business environment, but it is also the region making the most progress, accounting for one in every three regulatory reforms worldwide. The ten countries that most improved their business environment from June 2013 to June 2014 include five African countries that were in the bottom quintile globally for ease of doing business: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal and Togo.
The fact that these countries remain in the bottom quintile, however, indicates that further efforts are needed. Global risk analytics company Verisk Maplecroft assessed the rule of law, corruption, corporate governance, the regulatory framework, respect for property rights and supply chain labour risk and determined that Senegal’s economy improved the most in 2014. This was thanks to a strong anti-corruption drive. The improved business climate in countries that needed it the most correlates with Africa making “a giant leap” in attractiveness for foreign direct investment (EY, 2014) and with sustained growth rates (see Chapter 1; Ahmed, 2014). Mauritius is among the 30 economies worldwide where it is easiest to do business. Rwanda, South Africa and Tunisia are not far behind (World Bank, 2015a). Rwanda, for example, has implemented reforms estimated to have led to USD 5 million in cost savings for the private sector, investments of USD 45 million and an estimated 15 000 jobs (see Rwanda Country Note). Egypt, Morocco and South Africa occupy the top spots as FDI destinations, attracting 85% of all FDI to Africa (2007-13) (EY, 2014).
A sign of returning investor confidence, net FDI inflows to Egypt reached USD 4,1 billion in fiscal year 2013/14, compared to only USD 3,8 billion the previous fiscal year. Moreover, a new unified investment law is expected to be issued in 2015, standardising incentive schemes, facilitating market entry and exit procedures and expediting litigation and dispute resolution. The total tax rate fell in all regions of the world from 2004 to 2012, and it is sub‑Saharan Africa that had the biggest decline. Its average total tax rate dropped by almost 17 percentage points during this period. However, its average total tax rate still remains the highest, at 53% in 2012. Although the capacity of African countries to collect revenues had grown since 2000, it has dropped in recent years, driven chiefly by a large drop in revenue collection in Libya (AfDB Country Performance Assessment; World Bank IDA Resource Allocation Index). Despite these results, some countries recorded a regression in the business environment in 2014. This included not only countries affected by civil war and unrest, such as the Central African Republic and Libya, but also Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Zambia (World Bank, 2015b).
Transnational terrorism and civil war are the two main threats to Africa’s governance gains Terrorism and the trafficking that supports it are a clear threat to the continent’s growth and development, from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) and Boko Haram in West Africa to Ansar-al-Sharia in Northern Africa and Al-Shabaab in East Africa. For the President of Ghana and ECOWAS chairman John Mahama, “Terrorism is like a cancer, and if we don’t deal with it will keep going. It threatens everybody in the sub region. When it comes to terrorism nobody is too far or too near.” Boko Haram (“Western education is sin”) killed thousands of people in 2014, mainly in Nigeria but also in Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Neumann, 2014). As of January 2015, the terrorist organisation controlled about 50 000 square kilometres in the Nigerian states of Borno and Yobe. Despite the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, a local initiative that mobilised people around the world, most of the schoolgirls kidnapped in April 2014 remain in the hands of Boko Haram. As for Al-Shabaab (“the youth”) in Somalia, while it was driven out of the Somali capital and major towns by 2011, it killed 266 people in Kenya and Somalia in 2014, echoing the deadly raid against a Nairobi mall in 2013. The Somalia government remains fragile, with its third prime minister in two years following a standoff between the president and two successive prime ministers. Regional trafficking in arms, drugs and people funds these terrorist networks. Boko Haram is funded by militants and other terrorist networks, including Al-Qaeda, as well as trafficking in drugs and people. Similarly, Al-Shabaab has benefited from backing from other terrorist groups, state sponsors, the Somali diaspora, charities, piracy, kidnapping, the extortion of local businesses, and illicit trade in charcoal, sugar and ivory. Although the French-led military intervention in Mali in January 2013 disrupted drug trafficking networks, these span several countries, including Libya, Mauritania and Niger (ICG, 2013). East Africa is also a growing transit point for heroin from Afghanistan, although the volumes smuggled remain smaller than those that transit across Central Asia and Iran.
Environnement règlementaire
Source : Benchmarking Africa’s Costs and Competitiveness Banque Mondiale – 2011 (données 2006-2008) – E2
Taxes
Governments around the world need to provide the necessary services to ensure a good business environment. To achieve that, they levy a number of different taxes at different levels of administration. Being impossible to take all of them into account, we consider the three most common: corporate income tax, property tax, and value-added tax (VAT). Corporate tax rates vary considerably across regions, but Africa, together with South Asia, appears to be the least tax-friendly location to corporations.18With a rate of approximately 30 percent, African firms seem to be among the most highly taxed firms in the world.The difference with most regions, however, is not striking. In East Asia and Latin America, tax rates are 28 percent and 29 percent, respectively. Only in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are rates significantly lower, at 19 percent. The data also show a wide dispersion within each region, and especially within Africa. Botswana has the lowest corporate income tax in the world, with a 5 percent rate, while the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad share with Bangladesh the highest rate at 40 percent. Nonetheless, corporate tax rates in Africa are similar to those in China, India, and Vietnam. Except for South Asia—with a rate of 21 percent— Africa is the location with the highest property tax. Firms on the continent have to pay, on average, 7.5 percent of the value of the property in taxes.This is much higher than the 4.7 percent and 2.7 percent firms pay in East Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, respectively. A similar picture emerges if we look at VAT. Africa applies one of the highest average rates at 16 percent (second only to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with 19 percent), while VAT in all other regions amounts to 11–14 percent. As seen before for corporate tax, the spread of rates across the African continent is the widest, with Nigeria charging only 5 percent (as much as Singapore and Taiwan, China) while Tanzania charges 20 percent. Only Argentina charges more. Overall, if we look at all these costs on a comparative scale, we see that, with only two exceptions, Africa has a higher level of taxation than other regions (see Figure 5).
Regulations
The quality of the regulatory environment can encourage or discourage potential entrepreneurs to start a business, to expand its activity, or even to enter the formal economy. Evidence from other studies has shown that lower regulatory barriers stimulate entry into the formal sector.19 Is Africa a location with a friendly regulatory cost environment? We try to answer this question by looking at the costs associated with three indicators: establishing a business, registering property, and dealing with customs. Starting a business in Africa is not expensive in nominal terms.The total cost of the startup procedures and the minimum capital requirements add up to approximately US$2,350.This is less than startup costs in East Asia or Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where starting a business runs around US$3,700.20 However, if we take into account the average income per capita, then establishing a company in Africa becomes quite expensive.The total cost rises to 135 percent of annual income—more than double the cost in all other regions. Registering property is also an expensive process in Africa. Over 10 percent of the value of the property is spent on registration fees.This cost is much higher than in all other regions, where it ranges from 2 to 6 percent. At the extreme, Africa has countries where the registration cost gets closer to a quarter of the value of the property (Zimbabwe, Chad, and Nigeria). Finally, another important regulatory cost is that of customs clearance. In all countries, the great majority of firms import and export their inputs and goods.When exporting or importing, firms must follow the regulatory procedures enacted in each country.The costs associated with these procedures include the preparation of documents, administrative fees, and technical control charges. If we sum up all these costs, we see once again that Africa is the most expensive region among those taken into account. Firms in Africa must pay US$585 or US$682 each time they need to comply with import and export regulatory requirements. Firms in all other regions pay much less; in particular, firms in East Asia pay around 60 percent of the amount African firms are charged (Figure 6).
Les coûts invisibles
Source : Benchmarking Africa’s Costs and Competitiveness Banque Mondiale – 2011 (données 2006-2008) – E2
Losses experienced by firms because of the poor quality of the business environment are considered invisible costs. In the following section, we consider losses caused by bank financing requirements, unreliable infrastructure, excessive regulations, corruption, and security concerns. Losses due to bank financing requirements In the great majority of cases, firms are asked to provide collateral when applying for loans. Moreover, the value of the required collateral is usually higher than the value of the loan. In Africa, the value of the collateral that establishments are required to post to obtain a loan is the second highest in the world—equivalent to 137 percent of the value of the loan. Eastern Europe and Central Asia has the highest requirement of all, at 54 percent above the loan value, compared to East Asia and South Asia, where firms post collateral at only 13 percent and 3 percent above the value of the loan, respectively. This restriction limits access to finance for firms since, for a given amount of fixed assets, the higher the collateral requirements, the lower the ability of firms to secure credit. So, for instance, since African firms are asked to post collateral for 137 percent of the value of the loan, they can obtain loans equivalent to only approximately 57 percent of the value of their fixed assets. This represents a cost for firms because, for a given loan amount, they need to provide more guarantees than firms in other regions.We estimate such loss as the interest paid on the additional value of collateral that firms must post because of higher collateral requirements, where additional is defined as the value of collateral in excess of the median value observed in each country.21 According to these estimates, because of more stringent collateral requirements, firms in Africa have to pay an additional hidden charge in order to secure a loan. Under the assumption that firms in each country would be required to post collateral not higher than the median value of the loan, the estimated loss in additional interest paid by African firms is US$6,000 a year, the highest of all regions. In other words, if those firms in Africa that post a collateral above the median value would be allowed to reduce such collateral requirements to a value equal to that posted by the median firm, they would save, on average, US$6,000 a year. Firms in East Asia experience a much lower loss, estimated at 40–70 percent of that in Africa (Figure 7). In terms of fixed assets, the typical exporter in East Asia has three times as much as an exporter in Africa. Consequently it experiences higher losses than firms in Africa in nominal terms. However, these losses are less than proportional to the value of the fixed assets, demonstrating that even exporters in Africa pay more to obtain a loan of a given amount. Furthermore, exporters in South Asia, where exporters have an average value of fixed assets approximately equal to those in Africa, lose just one-fifth of the amount African exporters do because of excessive capital requirements in african countries.
Source : Benchmarking Africa’s Costs and Competitiveness Banque Mondiale – 2011 (données 2006-2008) – E2
Losses due to regulatory environment (Coûts induits par l’inefficacité de l’environnement règlementaire)
The regulatory environment is an important aspect of the business environment.A lot of micro evidence has shown that rules and regulations that are transparent and easy to interpret have a clear impact on any country’s competitiveness. Consequently, when rules and regulations become burdensome they represent an obstacle, and even a cost, for firms. There are different aspects of the regulatory environment we can look at. One is the time spent by managers in dealing with all government regulations, from taxes to licenses and inspections.This represents a clear cost since it distracts managers from the more important task of running the business. In this respect, Africa performs relatively well. In Latin American and the Caribbean— the worst of all the regions in this regard—managers spend on average over 8 percent of their time dealing with such requirements, whereas in Africa and East Asia, managers spend almost 5 percent of their time in this way. In South Asia and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, regulations are the least burdensome—the time spent by managers is around 4 percent. Interestingly, in oil-rich countries in Africa, regulations require much more of a manager’s time—almost double—while the opposite is true for landlocked countries, where regulations are less burdensome.We notice no substantial difference across firm size and exporter status. The inability of firms to adjust their fixed costs during business cycles also generates losses that decrease their productivity and ultimately their competitiveness. One of the reasons for such incapacity is the existence of strict labor regulations—in particular, limitations on hiring or firing workers. According to the Doing Business indicators, firms in Africa face the highest level of difficulties in hiring and firing workers of all regions. Does this labor market rigidity have a cost implication? We attempt to quantify this cost by estimating the losses caused by an excess or shortage of staff in our sample of firms. During the Enterprise Survey interviews, managers were asked to indicate how many more (or fewer) workers they would like to hire (or shed) if there were no labor regulations preventing them from doing so. Overall we observe that the great majority of firms in most regions report having the right size workforce. Africa shows the highest share of firms with the right level of employment, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia (see Figure 10). East Asia and Eastern Europe and Central Asia are the regions where, on the contrary, a considerable number of firms are not satisfied with their existing level of workforce. Using this information, we estimate the cost of labor restriction as either (1) extra wages paid—in the case of excess labor—or (2) value-added lost—in the case of shortage of staff.These estimates show that the average African firm enjoys the lowest cost—after South Asia— from labor regulations, at around US$30 a month. Firms in East Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, by comparison, lose around US$300 and US$170, respectively, a month.The highest loss from labor regulations is experienced by firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where labor restrictions are most pervasive. Another aspect of the regulatory environment that imposes costs on firms refers to retrenchment.When firms shed workers, they are required to pay a compensation determined by law.This cost is marginal in some cases, but it is not trivial in others, and it is higher in Africa than in all other regions.African firms are required to pay, on average, almost 1.5 years of wages when shedding labor, while the same firms in East Asia are required to pay a little over half that amount. Only firms in South Asia have the same requirement as African firms. However, in some African countries, such as in Zambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, firms are required to pay as much as 3 to 8 years of wages when firing a worker. An additional important aspect of the regulatory environment that has substantial cost implications for firms is the functioning of the courts, both in enforcing contracts and in closing businesses. Uncertainty in the applicability of rules of law has been shown to impact long-term growth, at the aggregate level, and to generate second-best behavior by firms—such as establishing informal networks based on ethnicity or other personal information—at the micro level.According to the Doing Business indicators, in Africa it costs on average almost half of the value of the claim (47 percent) to go through the court process.This value is almost the same in East Asia, but much higher than in other regions, with Eastern Europe and Central Asia being the least expensive, at 24 percent of the value of the claim. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,Mozambique, Malawi, and Burkina Faso court costs are so high that they could even exceed the value of the claim itself. Similarly, if a business fails, then the legal requirements that must be followed might make it lengthy and expensive to formally close that business. In Africa, the estimated costs of an insolvency process are high.The typical SME on the continent can expect to spend around 20 percent of the value of the estate in bankruptcy procedures.This is similar to costs in East Asia, but much higher than all other regions. Once again there is a wide variation across countries in Africa.This process can cost as little as 7 percent in Algeria,Tunisia, and Senegal or as much as 76 percent in the Central African Republic.
Coûts induits par la corruption
Source : Benchmarking Africa’s Costs and Competitiveness Banque Mondiale – 2011 (données 2006-2008) – E2
African managers still place corruption among the most important constraints to their businesses. Objective data confirm such perception. Firms in Africa pay close to 1.5 percent of sales in bribes to “get things done” and close to 3 percent of the value of contract when dealing with government procurement.This is more than three times as high as what firms in East Asia pay, and more than twice the amount paid in most other regions. The pattern of corruption across countries in Africa shows that petty corruption—to get things done—is pretty much the same across landlocked and coastal countries. However, there is a considerable difference among countries in the cost of corruption linked to government contracts (Figure 11). Interestingly, oil-rich countries perform much worse for both types of corruption than non-oil-rich ones. Finally, the level of development has a significant impact on government procurement corruption, but not on petty corruption. Large firms pay significantly less in bribes than small and medium firms, while domestic and nonexporters also show higher values of bribes paid than exporters and foreign firms.
Coûts induits par le manque de sécurité
Source : Benchmarking Africa’s Costs and Competitiveness Banque Mondiale – 2011 (données 2006-2008) – E2
Providing a safe environment where firms can conduct their business is a key function of any state. And yet, around the world, as much as 15 percent of firms report losses due to crime. In spite of this, a much higher share of firms (almost 60 percent) protect themselves from theft by using protection services, which adds to the cost of doing business. Interestingly, 16 percent of African firms report losses due to crime, at par with Eastern Europe and Central Asia and well above all other regions, but over half of the African firms employ private security services. Consequently, African firms spend a nontrivial amount on security services—equal to over half a percentage point of sales, which is considerably higher than East Asia or South Asia (Figure 12). There is no significant difference in the cost of security services borne by small firms compared to medium and large ones (in terms of share of sales), nor is there a difference between foreign and domestic firms. However, exporters in Africa spend more (almost 10 percent more) than non exporters.
Commodity downturn spurs disruption risks for Africa investors
Source : Global risk analytics company Verisk Maplecroft » – 2016
Job losses in the extractive sector of Africa’s resource-rich countries are expected to provoke industrial action, while the impacts of depressed oil, gas and metals prices on domestic government spending and rising living costs across the region are likely to stoke social turmoil.
The fact that 31 of sub-Saharan Africa’s 49 countries already fall within the ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ risk category of Verisk Maplecroft’s Civil Unrest Index 2016 underscores the threat of disruption for companies operating in these markets. Countries to watch include Central African Republic, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, DR Congo, South Africa and Nigeria.
The risk of civil unrest will be compounded by a strong El Niño event extending into early 2016, which may increase the cost of food staples as a result of reduced rainfall negatively affecting agricultural outputs. Verisk Maplecroft’s Food Security Index 2016 shows that all but five African countries are considered ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ risk.